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Regulation of railroads as an industry presum-
ably exempt from the discipline of normal com-
petition has reflected a broad social commit-
ment to a competitive ideal Accordingly, defi-
nition of the appropriate scope for private man-
agerial discretion regarding rail abandonments
has also been achieved and justified by refer-
ence to this basic standard. Recent abandon-
ment cases, however, cast doubt upon the pres-
ent vitality and relevance of the competitive
ideal. Professor Weissman concludes that
though this experience suggests the difficulties
inherent in the articulation and application of
a new norm, it prompts caution in deriving
policy recommendations from estimates of com-
petitiveness in the market for transport services.
Jacob Weissman*
I
To BE or not to be. Let us concede at once that for the rail-
roads this cannot be the question. Abandonment of track or opera-
tions usually involves much less than total extinction of the corporate
personality, and however strong the temptation to cast the railroads
in the role of romantic hero, even a decision to give up completely
can be contemplated with an equanimity impossible for Hamlet.
After all, the enterprise, having absorbed the costs of salvage, is
reasonably sure of rebirth as the assets of other undertakings. And
the pricing of assets, whatever their incarnation, must no doubt per-
sist as the ultimate concern of economic actors. Nevertheless, the
right to decide upon the form in which assets are to be held is a
necessary ingredient of real responsibility for the use of scarce re-
sources, and it thus seems reasonable to expect that inquiry into the
rather specific problem of railroad abandonments will shed light
f This article is based upon a study undertaken as a Research Associate in Law and
Economics in the School of Law, University of Chicago.
* Associate Professor of Law in the School of Business, University of Chicago
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upon the general question of managerial responsibility and upon the
degree to which such private discretion can and should be utilized
to direct the economy. It is with such broader considerations in
mind that it is proposed to examine and evaluate the present status
of the right of railroads to abandon a service.
II
Railroad regulation by the Federal Government reflected from
the outset the idealization of competitive behavior that matured
during the middle of the last century and gave form to the legisla-
tive response when social protest became intense after 1873. The
apparent paradox is easily resolved. The Sherman Act of 1890'
made it illegal to thwart the processes of the competitive market by
agreements in restraint of trade or by monopolization, on the as-
sumption that public and private interest would be reconciled in
the emerging industrial order if each economic actor desisted from
attempts to influence price and adapted demand or supply decisions
to a price given by the market.2 But the social norm that dictated
reliance upon unrestricted competition to the fullest possible extent
also pointed to the necessity for governmental intervention when
competition did not exist and could not be assured by fiat. Emer-
gence of the basic antitrust statute at almost the moment when con-
trols were being established for the transportation industry did not
indicate a contradiction in legislative standards. The Sherman Act
and the Interstate Commerce Act 4 are as related to each other as
the Yin and Yang of Chinese philosophy. The antitrust laws may be
called the "positive" principle, an affirmation of confidence in the
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1952).
2. The history of the Sherman Act, particularly since the appearance of the "rule
of reason" in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), has produced un-
certainty about the extent to which the commitment to reliance upon competition was
intended to stress the element of atomism (no firm taking into account the response of
others to its own action). An aspect of this problem appears in Dean Rostow's discus-
sion of whether, and to what degree, the Sherman Act intended "agreements in restraint
of trade" and "monopolization" under sections 1 and 2 of the act to be separate and
distinct crimes. See Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?,
43 ILL. L. REv. 745 (1949); Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. Cut. L.
REv. 153 (1947). But, in the world before Chamberlain's Tin TimonY OF MoNoPo-
LISTIC COMPETITION (1st ed. 1933) made economists and lawyers self-conscious about
oligopolistic market models, this uncertainty remained of little practical importance and
did not create doubt about the basic reliance of the law upon a competitive model as
a guide for judging business behavior. Weissman, The Law of Oligopoly (unpublished
thesis in University of California at Berkeley Library) chs. 1, 2 (1956).
3. See generally CLAu & CLARK, TvE CONTROL OF TRUSTS (1912), arguing for di-
rect action to supplement the "thou shalt nots" of the Sherman Act; CLAU, SOCIAL
CONTROL OF BUSINESS passim (2d ed. 1939).




unregulated mechanism of a competitive market.5 The Interstate
Commerce Act has represented the "negative principle, recognizing
the competitive ideal only to justify the imposition of social con-
trol when individual enterprise seems inescapably monopolistic or
morbidly and excessively competitive. The two declarations ap-
peared as complementary aspects of an identical social ideal
General application of the 'negative" principle to transport enter-
prise did not occur, of course, until the public- at least the politi-
cally potent sections of it that generated the Granger and Populist
crusades -became convinced that railroading was characterized by
monopoly.7 Until the early seventies railroads benefited with other
businesses from the evolving faith in laissez faire.8 Only as attention
shifted from the level of rates to rate discrimination between places 0
and parties 10 did the view of the railroad industry as a 'natural
monopoly" begin to crystallize." But no feature of railroad opera-
tion in the years before motor transport appeared was more likely
to emphasize the lack of alternatives that should characterize a com-
petitive supply than an abandonment. The courts acted early to
limit the right to abandon I-- though it is worth noting that be-
5. See generally REPORT OF THE ATToRNErY GENmw's NATnoNAL Co.fiurrEE To
S~rix Tm ANTn musT LAws 1-5 (1955).
6. The norm commanded respect because of its apparent precision. Desirable eco-
nomic behavior was defined in terms of responses to revenue and cost, leading toward
a long run equilibrium at which resources would be ideally allocated. Economic theory
tended to obscure the fact that the norm was far from unequivocal about the process
of adjustment to change and problems such as the impact of change upon individual
security-so important in abandonment cases. See BAn,;, Prucurc, DisrmnutmoN,
ANDEn LOYmENT 175-77 (1953). This made it easier to be confident that the com-
petitive ideal distinguished good (competitive) from wicked (monopolistic) behavior.
Whether this confidence can survive the "discovery" of monopolistic competition and
oligopoly is at the heart of the present inquiry.
7. The history is traced in Bucx, TaE GRANGER Movansmrr passim (1923).
8. Professor Sharfman, commenting on the Senate's full dress survey of the industry
in 1874 observes: "The Windom Committee concluded that the stimulation of compe-
tition would afford the most effectvie remedy against extortionate charges, and rec-
ommended, to this end, the further improvement of watervays and the construction
or acquisition of control by the Federal Government or the states of one or more lines
between the middle west and the seaboard to compete with the then existing carriers."
1 SH nFmAN, Tim INER TATE Co.aumc ComarssioN 17, n.13 (1931).
9. Those served by just one carrier presumably were burdened even by the perfectly
rational decision of the railroad to collect only variable costs at competing points.
10. Large shippers bargained for rebates unavailable to smaller rivals who did not
similarly give the carrier traffic in areas where competing carriers were available and so
could not exert the pressure of a threat to withdraw it.
11. See S. Rep. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
12. They undertook to protect the public that had relied upon the establishment of
service by a rigid rule that common carriers by rail must continue all services as long
as their operations as a whole were profitable. Abandonment of an unprofitable segment
was allowed only if the losses there jeopardized the entire investment Brooks-Scanlon
Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396 (1920). The promise that state regulatory com-
missions might moderate the common law by weighing local needs against the interest
of the general community in a healthy transportation system never materialized. See
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cause such social intervention emerged in an environment growing
more and more favorable to the idea of free enterprise the courts
chose to rely upon the law of contract for justification "13 And the
ease with which power over abandonments was transferred in 1920
from state to federal hands, by testifying to an unawareness that the
rise of motor transport rivalry would make the issue more important,
only confirms the strength of the prevailing conviction that the com-
petitive model was inappropriate for transportation and that compe-
tition could not be counted upon to explain, mitigate or justify
railroad abandonments. 14
It must be acknowledged that the "affirmative" and "positive"
character of the Transportation Act of 1920 " does seem to argue
that the act was itself a testimonial to the decline of the competitive
ideal and the emergence of a new standard idealizing in a general
sense the broad national interest in "adequate transportation." 10
Such a transformation was perhaps intended, as one result of the
heightened sense of national - in contrast with individual - welfare
engendered by the war. Judging, however, from the subsequent his-
tory of the abandonments section, it cannot be said that a new
ideal was articulated clearly enough to become controlling. The
Commission quickly interpreted "public convenience and necessity"
to refer to the local public directly affected by an abandonment,
foregoing the opportunity to consider each abandonment in the
light of a national interest in the rail network as a whole.17 Professor
CHERINGTON, THE REGULATION OF RAILROAD ABANDONMENTS ch. 2 (1948); li'rs,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION AND ABANDONMENT UNDER TIXE
TRANSPORTATION ACT OF 1920, at 7 (1929).
13. The railroads, and other utilities, had themselves promoted the historical victory
of contract over status in this area in order to avail themselves of the doctrine of Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819), and stave off impair-
ment of charter rights wrested from legislatures that might later change their minds.
So strong did the notion of railroad charters as contracts become that courts at first,
when insisting upon continuance of a service, sought justification in the strict construc-
tion of the charter language. Obviously, this technique had its limitations, for the law
of contracts knows of conditions (the obligation to serve could be conditioned upon the
possibility of earning a return) and consideration (the public's consideration for the
promise to serve might be its willingness and ability to use the service sufficiently),
and legislatures began to provide for statutory controls. See in this connection Field,
The Withdrawal from Service of Public Utility Companies, 35 YALE L.J. 169 (1925);
Bonin, Public Utilities - Railroads - Discontinuance of Passenger Service on Branch
Lines, 26 TUL. L. REv. 110 (1951).
14. CHERINGrON, op. cit. supra note 12, at 36.
15. 41 Stat. 456 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
16. The act, for example, imposed upon the Commission responsibility for fixing
rates that would assure an adequate national railway system, and granted authority
to divide rates on the basis of distinctions between weak and strong roads. See Wiscon-
sin R.R. Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563, 585 (1922).
17. The leading case is Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926). Senator
Clyde Reed's bill in 1943, S. 1489, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943), was offered to upset
just this Commission interpretation of its responsibilities and require a broader view
of the public interest in any abandonment.
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Cherington has blamed this "particularist" approach on the fact that
the only existing body of law which the Commission could use as a
guide was local in character, that local protestants made themselves
heard as those with a national view could not, and that in the period
just after 1920 the potential range of the abandonment problem
was still unrealized.'
But, if the new law really expressed the demise of the competitive
ideal for transport, it seems strange that the Commission so docilely
accepted, and persisted in, a narrow interpretation of its responsi-
bilities. If, on the other hand, the legislation was basically a renewed
effort to assure by governmental intervention what was ideally
expected from the free play of competition, the "particularist" ap-
proach adopted by the Commission did make good sense. The
failures of the unregulated market reveal themselves in particular
markets and in particular burdens imposed by noncompetitive
conditions of supply or demand. A regulatory body, viewing its
authority as a substitute for the competitive market, would tend
to relate its orders to the local circumstances in which the degree
of competition or monopoly was revealed. The Commission's own
view, as manifested by its treatment of abandonments, tends to
support the suggestion that the essentially complementary nature
of federal transport and antitrust policies persisted beyond 1920.10
III
Since the law of abandonments grew as an integral part of total
transport policy, application of section 1(18) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act"0 could hardly have been modified to reflect at once and
18. CHERInCTON, op. cit. supra note 12, ch. 2. It took time to realize that the shrink-
age begun during the war was to persist and accelerate. See UmT-rz STATES BUREAu
oF THE CENSUS, HIsroIwcAL STATISTICS oF T UNrTE STATES, 1789-1945, at 202
(Series K-29 1949).
19. When the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-29 (1952) and
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1952),
undertook to outlaw certain competitive practices as "discriminatory" or "unfair," they
did so in the name of the competitive ideal and professed to be checking incipient
monopoly. When the Transportation Act of 1920, 41 Stat. 456 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 1
(1952), encouraged such monopolistic practices as supervised railroad combination
and a measure of profit pooling, it testified to the degree of social control felt warranted
by the failure of transport to conform to the ideal pattern. The shift of control over
abandonments from state to federal hands in the 1920 act served, in fact, to expand
the carriers' freedom to adjust to changing competitive conditions. The process by
which Congress completed the transformation of the ICC from policeman into guardian
provided the railroads with a forum that could receive sympathetically requests for
permission to abandon and subsequently facilitated the abandonment of more than
10% of the national railroad network. U.S. BuREAu OF THE CENsus, HISrorucA. STA-
Ta-TIcs Or THE UN=-ED STATES, 1789-1945 (Series K2, K29 1949).
20. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1(18) (1952). The section states:
"No carrier by railroad subject to this chapter shall abandon all or any portion of a
line of railroad, or the operation thereof, unless and until there shall first have been
1958]
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completely the appearance of competitive factors in abandonment
cases. So long as competition was not deemed pervasive enough to
permit a general reduction in the degree of governmental control,
particular incidents of competition could well be thought disequi-
librating rather than equilibrating. The decision to control motor
transport in 1935, after Joseph Eastman's classic survey of the in-
dustry, was a recognition of this possibility.2' Nevertheless, it is rea-
sonable to suppose that the growing importance of competition
could receive acknowledgment most quickly in the judging of re-
quests for permission to abandon. Abandonments, after all, are
normally part of a drive for economic health and not apt to serve
as a stratagem in an excessively competitive game.22 Congress did
not deem it necessary to provide that motor carriers get permission
for total abandonments when regulating this segment of the indus-
try, or to put any limit upon the freedom of water carriers to aban-
don service when subjecting these revitalized rivals of the railroads
to ICC control in 1940.23 Given the basic premise that the dimen-
sions of its controls are established by the extent of competition, the
Commission has had similar inducement to acknowledge rivalry as
the cause of abandonments and then to find abandonments thus
motivated to be consistent with "public convenience and necessity."
The history of abandonments, at least until the mid-forties, evi-
dences such a regulatory response. 4
obtained from the commission a certificate that the present or future public convenience
and necessity permit of such abandonment."
21. Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Regulation of Transportation Agencies,
S. Doc. No. 152, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), which led to the enactment of the Federal
Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 543 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27
(1952). Many believed, of course, that the possibility should not have been used to
justify control of trucking, in itself an industry fitting the competitive model very
closely. See, e.g., Nelson, New Concepts in Transportation Regulation, in TntANsron-
TATION AND NATIONAL POLICY 197 (1942).
22. TROXEL, ECONO,'ICS OF TRANSPORT eh. 22 (1955).
23. The Transportation Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.SC. § 1 (1052),
established controls over water carriage as Part III of the Interstate Commerce Act,
24 Stat. 379 (1887). See in this connection 54 Stat. 929 (1940), 49 U.S.C. §§ 901-23
(1952). Regulation of air transport in 1938, however, involving an industry for which
competition was deemed an untrustworthy control, provided that all abandonments
must be approved in advance by the Civil Aeronautics Board. See Civil Aeronautics
Act, 52 Stat. 987 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 481(k) (1952).
24. A review of the first 120 certificates granted by the ICC, to May 1, 1925, sug-
gested that rail and nonrail rivalry together accounted for 20.1% of the cases. Trum-
bower, Railroad Abandonments and Their Relation to Highway Transportation, 6
PUBLIC ROADS 169-73 (1925). When all approvals through 1940 were considered by
Cherington, competition was found to explain 32.9%. CILMRINTON, op. Cit. supra
note 12, ch. 5. In an ICC study limited to cases decided from 1935 through 1943, the
figure jumped to 52.7%. ICC BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS,
RAILROAD ABANDONMENTS, 1920-1943 (Statement No. 453, 1945).
For an interesting discussion of how "coordination" of regulated transport aims -
and should aim -at achieving the competitive ideal result so far as rates are con-
[Vol. 43:251
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Recall, however, the character of the law of abandonments and
the economic pattern of an abandonment case, particularly when
the railroad's difficulties stem from the encroachments of a com-
peting mode of transportation. The law demands a "balancing of
interests," the authorities undertaking to say whether local protest-
ants are entitled to protection against a carrier's attempt to improve
its own position.2 5 The clear implication that some interests must
be left unprotected, some burdens of adjustment left to fall where
they may, is emphasized by the economic aspects of a typical situ-
ation. There is no reason to expect that all shippers will find it
equally feasible to utilize the new service that has emerged in an
area as the increasingly successful competitor of a railroad. On the
contrary, when rail traffic has shrunk to a point at which manage-
ment no longer can consider the investment warranted, many indi-
vidual shippers are likely to find themselves threatened by higher
costs that do not bear equally upon their own competitors, located
on railroads with different traffic characteristics. Permitting an
abandonment in such circumstances imposes upon these shippers
the problem of adjusting, perhaps moving, their enterprise, with a
consequent impact upon related businesses and individuals..28
The Commission, then, in its "balancing," cannot avoid responsi-
bility for the distribution of the costs of economic change. What is
more, it is here engaged directly in the process by which the mean-
ing of "managerial discretion" is defined. And, in order that such
critical interventions may be characterized as just, the Commission's
decisions must derive support from the basic social norm that the
statute is presumed to express. The writer has undertaken to prove
elsewhere that it is precisely the role of the ideal element in law to
reconcile the conflicting claims of formal consistency and the imple-
mentation of concrete social purpose. 7 The details of the argument
cerned, see Locklin, Transport Coordination and Rate Policy, 15 HAnv. Bus. REv. 417
(1937).
25. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926).
26. This is, after all, what would happen in a normal, competitive market, and is
the effect that the ICC was, in fact, established to achieve.
It is sometimes suggested that protests against the abandonment of a passenger
service are frivolous, entered as a matter of pride by communities that no longer need
or use the service. See, e.g., Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transporta-
tion of the Senate Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 25 and passim, (1958). Perhaps some protests by local governments or
community organizations when freight is involved are similarly motivated. But, if the
railroad requesting an abandonment certificate is assumed to be making a rational
decision, there seems no good reason to doubt the good faith and economic rationality
of businessmen who testify that loss of rail service will force them into a difi!ult
competitive position and that they cannot economically use the substitute carrier.
27. Weissman, op. cit. supra note 2. The proof utilized an analysis of the law con-
cerning agreements in restraint of trade. The notion was suggested by Morris Cohen's
"polarity principle." See CoHEm, Prologue to RAsoN AND LAW (1950).
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need not be presented here, but application of the thesis to the
abandonment problem would indicate that lack of a generally ac-
cepted norm must create doubt about the justice of the Commission's
rulings and frustrate efforts to agree upon the essential elements of
either "managerial discretion" or 'public convenience and necessity."
Protestants will insist that they are being sacrificed to an excessively
formal definition of managerial prerogatives. Carriers will discover,
as heatedly, that there is no certain limit to what restraints upon
change the Commission can declare expedient. Both sides, agree-
ing on the facts, will find the public intervention capricious and
arbitrary. If the Commission has avoided serious charges of exces-
sive rigidity or pure arbitrariness, its success can be explained in
large measure by the fact that its rulings as an acknowledged substi-
tute for the unrestricted market have manifested an awareness of
the force and relevance of the very same competitive ideal that has
simultaneously justified the impact of enterprise in uncontrolled sec-
tors of the economy.2" But to recognize this is to at once be put on
notice that, if the social commitment to such a basic ideal has
altered, at least so far as change in transport is concerned, the Com-
mission's efforts to establish the limits of private managerial dis-
cretion could no longer so easily be characterized as just, unless,
perhaps, they could be related to some more acceptable ideal sug-
gesting the new proper balance between the claims of social change
and individual (local) security.29 It is, therefore, of particular inter-
est that recent abandonment experience, as evidenced by ICC
decisions and the debates and actions of Congress, does question
in a variety of ways the present force of the competitive ideal."
IV
The Commission itself, of course, could hardly be expected to
trumpet a shift from the traditional foundations of its abandonment
28. Conversely, critics must profess to find that the Commission, in deciding what to
"balance" against the carrier's loss, fails to limit itself to the adjustment costs imposed
upon shippers by lack of a reasonably adequate set of transport alternatives.
29. Norms relevant to economic behavior may be compound concepts, mingling
aesthetic or other values with economic ones. The attitude toward clustering of persons
in urban centers, for example, can obviously affect social judgment of changes in
transport service. Nevertheless, it will be convenient to keep the present discussion in
economic terms, contrasting the competitive ideal with standards stressing securit
and stability. On the question of norms for economic behavior see Levin, StandarXs
of Welfare in Economic Thought, 70 Q.J. EcoN. 117 (1956).
30. Reliance upon impressions gained from ICC decisions means concentration
upon freight operations and the effects of abandonments upon businesses. Clearly
disputes over passenger service raise similar questions about the appropriate norms
for dividing public and private responsibility, but, since these typically arise in partial
discontinuance rather than abandonment proceedings, they are generally judged by
state commissions, with political as contrasted to economic considerations likely to
[Vol. 43:251
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policy. As a quasi-judicial body it shares the desire of any court
or continuity and consistency. And since relatively few of the aban-
donment cases reported during the 1945-1955 decade were con-
cerned primarily with competition as the cause of the abandonment,3'
there have been few opportunities to discover the Commission in
the act of acknowledging the competitive impact while persisting
in ignoring it. Yet there is provocative evidence that this has oc-
curred. Consider, for example, the government's continued thwart-
ing of the efforts by the Chicago & North Western Railway Co. to
abandon its service to What Cheer, Iowa. For many years this town
of 1100 inhabitants, situated in an agricultural area producing prin-
cipally corn, oats, and soybeans, enjoyed the service of two inde-
pendent railroads. The North Western ran a 87-mile branch south
to What Cheer from Belle Plaine on its main Chicago-Omaha route,
the line having been constructed by a predecessor in 1884. Until
early in 1957 the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co. also
offered service, on a 5-mile stub branch from What Cheer to Thorn-
burg, a station on the Rock Island's Iowa City-Montezuma branch.
In 1942 the North Western requested permission to abandon its
branch, urging that traffic no longer sufficed to support two roads
and that operation of their line was already a net drain on system rev-
get particular attention. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Surface Transporta-
tion of the Senate Commitee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 1, at 25 (1958); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Transportation Policy of
the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 574
and passim (1956).
The fact that the ICC undertook on its own initiative to read authority over pas-
senger discontinuances out of the powers granted to it in 1920 suggests reservations
about making the test of the market place all important in transport. See in this con-
nection Palmer v. Massachusetts, 808 U.S. 79 (1939). On the other hand, the current
attempt to extend ICC control over passenger discontinuances, incorporated in the
Transportation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 568 (U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 2969, 2972
(Aug. 20, 1958)), reflects a partial success for the efforts of the railroads to revital-
ize an assumed commitment to a competitive ideal for transport. Whether the new
act will have this result cannot be known in advance of actual ICC decisions. It should
be noted, first, that the Senate sponsor of the recent bill, Senator Smathers of Florida,
has associated his sponsorship with suggestions for public subsidy of railroad passenger
service, and, second, that interests protesting easing of abandonment are not subdued,
having challenged the constitutionality of the new provision in a New Jersey action
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1958, p. 36, col. 2.
31. This fact and the contrast with pre-war observations of a much more frequent
competitive component in the cases have relevance for a final evaluation of the appro-
priate role for competition in transportation. It should be addd that the suggestions
offered here about factors challenging clear-cut use of a competitive standard have
been culled from a sample of ICC decisions during the decade. The limitation was
imposed by the fact that since 1942 the Commission has only published a substantial
sampling of its decisions. (The published reports are intended to include all in which
novel considerations or shifts in policy appear.) More cases might have lengthened
the list of elements compromising or negating a competitive test, but would be very
unlikely to dilute the weight of factors urged upon our attention by the cases in the
sample.
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enues, with worse losses in prospect since substantial maintenance
costs could no longer be deferred. The merits of this application,
which was denied,32 need not be weighed here, for the possibilities
of trucking were confused by extraordinary war-time restrictions,
and the Commission's decision no doubt was affected by a desire to
moderate the rash of abandonments suddenly being justified by the
War Production Board's demand for scrap rails.83 Early in 1945,
with the end of the war in sight, the carrier renewed its attempt to
secure a certificate. And the Commission, though it challenged the
method by which the railroad sought to prove its loss, acknowledged
that, even if different accounting techniques showed the branch to
be contributing something to the system's general overhead burden,
"the future holds no prospects of substantial earnings" to justify ex-
tensive rehabilitation expenditures. 4 Nevertheless, the request was
again denied,35 the Commissioners unanimously agreeing that aban-
donment was still unjustified since, with the extent of the railroad's
loss in dispute, there was no doubt that major outlays for repair
could be delayed "for at least another year" and that war-neglected
roads and trucks were still the only-and unsatisfactory--substi-
tutes available to shippers if rail service stopped.8
Four years later, when highways were again in normal repair
and trucks readily available, the North Western for the third time
sought permission to act upon its own considered judgment that the
service from Belle Plaine to What Cheer should be abandoned.
Though tonnage handled by the branch had actually increased since
the previous request was rejected, the railroad maintained that costs
had risen more than revenues, and that its estimates proved aban-
donment would still give the system a badly needed increase in net
revenue. Prospects for further tonnage increases were said to be
negligible, since the growing range of truck service not only argued
against expecting rail recapture of livestock traffic but promised to
divert other carriage as well. Deferred maintenance continued to
press for attention. And, finally, it was announced that the Rock
Island stood ready to acquire a North Western spur and thereby
32. Chicago & No. West Ry. Trustee Abandonment, F.D. 13907, 254 I.C.C. 809(1943).
33. The number of applications approved jumped from 118 in 1941 to 180 in 1942,
after averaging only 112 in the five preceding years. The previous high was 157 in
1934. ICC Buratr oF TRANsPoRT & STATISTICS, 1920-1943, op. cit. supra note 24, at 4.
Of course, the problem posed for the Commission by the war carries its own mplica-
tions concerning the usefulness of reference to a competitive norm in an economy being
organized for actual or anticipated military effort.
34. Chicago & No. West. Ry. Abandonment, F.D. 13907, 261 I.C.C. 801 (1940).
35. Ibid.
36. The applicant's suggestion that the biggest shippers could arrange to use the
Rock Island was also dismissed for the time being since equipment needed by the Rock
Island for an immediate expansion of service was in short supply.
[Vol. 43:251260
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continue rail service for most of the tonnage in and out of What
Cheer. 7 The carrier did not prevail. The renewed application pro-
duced two decisions, one by a Division 4 panel, after a further hear-
ing,"' the other by the full Commission.39 Both decisions rejected
the railroad's petition. Yet it was clear that in doing so the regula-
tory agency had changed somewhat the basis for its rulings. Stress
was no longer placed upon the unavailability of substitute service,
nor did the Commissioners express serious doubt that truck rivalry
was at the heart of the branch's dim prospects. ° Instead, having
observed that a number of shippers had testified about real costs
to them from a cessation of rail service, the Commission chose to
minimize the carrier's claimed loss and to substitute its judgment for
that of management in deciding what costs would be saved by an
abandonment 4' It did not concede that Iowa property taxes attrib-
uted to the branch account should be deemed a "savable" expense.4-
It denied that roadway depreciation charges could be treated as
other than a bookkeeping expense, and adhered to the position al-
ready established in another Chicago & North Western case4 that
only actual outlays, unavoidable in the relevant period, could be
counted. And, in estimating the costs of handling branch traffic on
other system lines-which would be avoided if the branch were
abandoned-the Commission insisted upon its own rule of thumb,
using 50% of the revenue assigned to the rest of the system from
trafc originating or terminating on the branch instead of the ap-
proximately 60% used by the railroad in its own calculations. 4 In
37. The spur served the clay products firm which alone accounted for more than
half of all the business of the North Western's entire line.
38. Chicago & No. West. By. Abandonment, F.D. 13907, 282 LC.C. 802 (1951).
39. Chicago & No. West. By. Abandonment, 282 I.C.C. 525 (1952).
40. Commissioner Mahaffle's dissent emphasized just these considerations in arguing
that maintenance of two rail services in the area was economically unwarranted. Id. at
535.
41. To justify an abandonment it must be shown that otherwise unavoidable outlays
can be saved thereby in an amount exceeding the revenues lost to the entire system by
the contraction. Presumably the carrier has no quarrel with such a test in principle, for
its own desire to abandon should rest upon it. Troxm, op. cit. supra note 22, at 521-29.
42. Whether abandonment of a line segment will reduce property taxes depends
upon the particular method used by the state to assess values and set rates. To the
degree that valuations depend upon net earnings or the value of the carrier's stocks
and bonds, a justified abandonment can raise the tax base and actual tax outlays. The
opposite result can be expected when the tax base is related to gross revenues or to
the cost of the installation. Iowa has given its commissions wide discretion but net
earnings and the value of securities have been regularly considered. See Lynch, Rail-
road Taxation and Abandonments, 18 H~xnv. Bus. REv. 496 (1940).
43. A Nebraska branch was involved. Chicago & No. West. Ry. Abandonment, 275
LC.C. 759 (1951).
44. The carrier did not dispute that it was harder to ascertain the exact costs of
adding branch traffic to the general flow of traffic on other parts of the railroad system
than to find costs directly assignable to branch operations or calculate system revenues
derived from branch traffic. But it argued that realistic estimates should take into
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short, the Commission chose to defend the public interest by dis-
puting the railroad's calculations of its own private interest, find-
ing that the branch had a "feeder" value to the North Western in
spite of the managerial declaration to the contrary.
The history of rail service to What Cheer can be brought quickly
up to date. On March 28, 1956, the Rock Island line applied for per-
mission to abandon the stub branch from Thornburg. Net system
losses for each of the two preceding years were proved by standard
ICC accounting methods. And in December the Commission found
that "the present and future public convenience and necessity per-
mit abandonment. '' 4  The Commission observed optimistically that
the line's largest shipper, a What Cheer coal and lumber yard, might
find a site on the North Western's track, or, even better, that the
North Western might purchase at net salvage value the trackage
needed to extend its own service to the lumber company - though
the North Western had indicated no such intention in response to the
Rock Island's informal inquiry. In the event, the forty-day waiting
period passed without an offer from the North Western, the Rock
Island tracks were physically removed (March, 1957), and at almost
the same moment the Chicago & North Western instituted a new
effort to abandon its branch1 4 The railroad's subsequent testimony
indicated that prompt outlays of nearly $600,000 -indeed, over
$1,100,000 if future maintenance were to be kept normal- had be-
come absolutely necessary to permit continued safe operation. On
June 4, 1958, sixteen years after permission was first sought, approval
was granted, ending rail service to What Cheer.
When the Commission rejects a request for a rate change, it is
often tempting to accuse it of economic naivet6, of failing to recog-
nize, for example, that softening one carrier's economic thrust may
serve only to preserve returns on the excess, unneeded capacity of
another.47 But in abandonment cases, with the public interest explic-
account the actual freight operating ratio, which is higher for the North Western than
for competing carriers, and use a so-called "out-of-pocket" operating ratio (80% of
the full ratio) to determine the savable cost figures. The Commission considered this
argument in some detail, only to reject it, in the Nebraska case, supra note 43.
45. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R. Abandonment, F.D. 19308, (I.C.C. 1956) (not to be
reported in full). Service had been reduced in April, 1955, to tri-weekly round trips
instead of daily runs, and shippers did not dispute the argument that no new traffic
was in prospect that might reverse the recent appearance of losses or pay for necessary
rehabilitation. And though it is not clear from the record that truck delivery was
responsible for the modest amount of tonnage carried by this very short line, the rail-
road had anticipated some protest possibilities by establishing the Rock Island Motor
Transit, a common carrier operating through What Cheer over regular routes. The
North Western had alleged in its earlier applications that motor carrier service was
available to the area, but failed to prove that authorized truckers were in fact offering
regular common carrier service.
46. F.D. 19691, Chicago & North Western, Traffic World, March 16, 1957, p. 49.
47. The possibility clearly exists when minimum rate fixing is involved and the
protest is by a rival carrier rather than an aggrieved shipper. This is not to say that
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itly introduced by the phrase "public convenience and necessity,"
the record cannot as easily be said to evidence a lack of economic
sophistication. Carrier costs are assessed diligently and the burdens
of an unprofitable operation upon interstate commerce duly ac-
knowledged. The Commission makes a serious effort to minimize
the risk of catering to excessively vague or even imaginary burdens
of protestants. 48 The explanation for the Commission's persistent in-
terference with rail management in situations like that at What
Cheer cannot be expected to lie chiefly in faulty economic analysis.
On the contrary, the law regulating abandonments may be assumed
to accept the dictates of sound economic reasoning as an element
in a total legislative effort to do justice. And when it is realized that
the What Cheer situation seems more readily explained by the ap-
pearance of truck competition than any other freight case reported
by the ICC since 1945, it is particularly intriguing to observe that
the Commission ultimately chose to stress its rejection of manage-
ment's judgment concerning costs and maintenance policies and
revenue prospects, while permitting the matter of rivalry and alter-
natives for shippers to slip from view. This development certainly
suggests that the Commission's attitude reflected some diminution in
the vitality of the competitive norm and its usefulness for interpret-
ing and applying legislative declarations of policy. It could as well
mean recognition that the decision of the carrier to abandon, when
able to prove a loss only by reliance upon accounting methods dif-
ferent from those generally used in abandonment cases and which
put the branch operation in its least favorable light, might be mo-
tivated by managerial considerations not amenable to judgment
merely by reference to the competitive standard.49
critics of the rate cases are justified in succumbing to the temptation. See TaoxEL, op.
cit. surpa note 22, at 438; LocmLwr, EcoNo.ncs or TRANspOrrAmo- 328 (4th ed.
1954).
48. The Commission, for example, has not been impressed by claims that real estate
in the neighborhood of the line would suffer a general decline in value, and has thus
avoided abuse of the concept of social costs that could result from its inability to
receive at the same time proofs that realty values in other neighborhoods might in
fact be raised by the alteration and greater health of the transport network Boston &
M.R.R. Abandonment, 290 I.C.C. 415 (1954). The tribunal tends to guide itself by
financial considerations, and to count the measurable impact of altered transport costs
more heavily than claims regarding other aspects of protestants' operations, which may
be evidenced by a wide variety of accounting techniques. 3 Sa AnrmA, Tan Iwrnm-
SrATE Co imsacE CohanssioN 341-48 (1948).
49. Commission did not articulate such a justification for its stubborn rejection
of the carrier's request for relief from the impact of growing competition. And it is by
no means intended to derogate from the merit of the Chicago & North Western's at-
tempt to leave What Cheer. Modification of the function of the competitive norm and
acknowledgment of another standard need not indicate that the company's request
should have been denied.
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to imagine a spectrum of managerial purposes- all
perfectly reasonable-that could concern a regulatory commission charged with
protecting local interests and attentive to considerations other than the growth of
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Exactly the same possibilities are suggested- and even more
forcefully - by the attempt of the Ohio & Morenci Railroad Co. to
abandon a 21-mile line between Allen Junction and Morenci, both
in Ohio. In 1933 the Toledo & Western Ry. Co. obtained permission
to abandon 43 miles of its road and sold it for $55,000 to Joseph
Schontal Co., a scrap iron dealer planning to realize a profit through
salvage operations. Only part of the line was scrapped, however, for
Schontal decided that the Allen Junction-Morenci section could be
run profitably and created the Ohio & Morenci as a subsidiary for
this purpose. Results justified the decision. The road made money and
built up its corporate surplus while paying regular dividends to the
parent company and its successor, Sumner Company. For six years
ending with 1948, earnings amounted to almost 9% on the total invest-
ment, reaching 15% for 1948 alone. But in that year management found
reason to be dissatisfied nonetheless. The price of re-rolling rails
sky-rocketed to nearly $70 per ton, and Sumner's estimate of the
salvage value of its asset rose also, to $242,800. Since 1947 earnings
would represent only a 2% return on this swollen value, the owners
wanted to liquidate. The Commission denied the application, frus-
trating the shrewd judgment of management (scrap falling below
$35 again in 1949).5° Though a "public need" for rail service was
said to have been established by the testimony of some small ship-
pers, the burden was apparently a very modest one. The New York
Central had already arranged to provide service to the two biggest
shippers in Morenci, who together gave the line over 40% of its
revenue. The general area, near Toledo, did not seem to suffer from
any peculiar lack of transport alternatives. And Sehontal's decision
to continue rail service after the ICC had itself found total aban-
donment justified was not found to have induced substantial entry
by shippers especially dependent upon railroad facilities. The de-
cision, providing only for "renewal without prejudice after two
years," made it very clear that the Commission was chiefly con-
cerned to moderate the pace at which local communities could be
forced to adapt to changes in transportation service, however sound
the carrier's judgment about the best use of its resources.51
competition in the supply of transport. They might range from the desire to realize a
tax loss, to the raising of working capital by avoiding scheduled maintenance (and
avoiding tackling less tractable elements of the corporate financial pattern), to the
building of a record in abandonment cases as leverage for rate proposals, or even to
the soothing of stockholders by a display of managerial activity. Specific examples of
such motives appear in the analyses of the cases discussed in the text infra.
50. Ohio & M.R.R. Abandonment, F.D. 16332, 275 I.C.C. 818 (1949).
51. To pass off the ruling as a protest against "profiteering" clearly Introduces a
rival to the traditional competitive standard. Actually, such an explanation is not very
convincing here when it is remembered that the company's original decision to postpone
salvage had given the community unexpected use of the road for 16 years, and that
1949 was not characterized by the regulations and acute shortages that give profit-
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Winona R.R., Abandonment52 raises similar questions in a some-
what different way. At the beginning of 1947 this railroad was com-
prised of two segments, one being the 18.5 miles running north from
Warsaw, Indiana, to New Paris, the other a forty-mile line south from
Warsaw to Peru. The stockholders, who also owned the $600,000
worth of bonds issued by the company, initiated an effort to improve
the railroad's financial picture by voluntarily writing off $200,000 of
the bond debt. They next secured permission to abandon the south-
ern segment, and used the salvage proceeds to retire another
$150,000 of the bond issue. As a third step they purchased some
property from the railroad for something over $31,000 in bonds.
Then in 1948 the owners sold the rest of their interest, the stock
and the $218,750 worth of bonds still outstanding, for $44,000 to a
group made up of men who had been-and remained- officers
of the company. The new owners continued the liquidation process,
selling various assets for a total of about $106,000. Some of the
cash thus acquired was used to pay off debts on the assets sold,
$9000 was paid against the bonds, and a small amount went for
financing of rail operations. But about $53,000 was still in a deposit
account when the company requested permission to abandon com-
pletely. The application declared that the salvage value was $68,000
plus the value of the right of way, that the line could not be run
profitably, and that the new owners had to withdraw to save their
investment
In denying the application the Commission, of course, tried to
minimize the claims of loss. The road had, in fact, almost covered
expenses in 1948, when especially energetic solicitation by the presi-
dent had secured for the line a much increased tonnage of coal
traffic.53 But this traffic fell off when labor troubles hit the mines
late in the year, and management professed to lack confidence that
it could be recaptured. Indeed, it is not at all clear why the ICC
should itself have been pleased with what had actually been a
diversion of freight from the other better-located carriers that pre-
viously carried it." The fact is that the decision suggests the Com-
mission's uneasiness about the entire process by which the aban-
donment petition emerged and seems to rest upon a conviction that
shippers are entitled to protection against a management more con-
cerned with liquidating assets than with a serious effort to run the
taking a pejorative aspect On the contrary, the slump in business activity during
1948-1949 reenforces the impression that the Commission was manifesting a height-
ened sensitivity to the pains and pace of economic adjustment.
52. F.D. 16566, 275 C.C. 818 (1950).
53. Not originating on or destined to the line, but carried by it as a "bridge" between
other railroads.
54. Both the Pennsylvania and the New York Central serve the territory, the former
going through Warsaw.
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road. The two main protestants did allege that they had increased
their operations (one was a creamery, the other a gravel and sand
company) in 1948 in reliance upon the assurances of the new Wi-
nona owners, but it is not clear why either was entitled to special
consideration for exercising poor judgment. The Commission in
effect decided to temper the impact upon any shippers of factors
that the market in which they purchased transport services might
not easily reveal. Management could, for example, have resolved
to liquidate for tax reasons or to rearrange ownership and control
of particular properties, with the business of transport an incidental
consideration. And though the abandonment was later granted,"'
so that a loss was in effect forced upon the owners of the road by
the delay, the Commission apparently felt that it was a proper use
of its powers to reduce the pace at which shippers must adjust to
such enterprise in a transportation industry. There was no indica-
tion that available alternatives entailed more serious cost increases
to shippers than in any case where growing truck rivalry brings a
rail line to the point of abandonment and a certificate is normally
granted. The only unique factor was the possibility of a managerial
motive not directly related to the degree of competitive pressure
in its market.
The three cases just described must suffice here to show that
though the Commission's regulatory powers emerged from an ideali-
zation of competition, and though the railroads and the Department
of Commerce still urge that the degree of competition in transport
measures the appropriate bounds of regulatory interference with
managerial discretion in the use of transportation resources, the
Commission has apparently responded to considerations quite dis-
tinct from the competitive one. Cases in which certificates were
denied have been used as illustrations to emphasize the fact that
Commission rulings do define the managerial function. It should
not be assumed, however, that decisions in which abandonments
were approved must fail to reveal the force of elements other than
the intensity of competition. Approval was granted when a carrier
was extremely anxious to realize a $700,000 income tax credit,"" or
to cash in on an enormous increase in salvage value after the OPA
removed ceiling prices on scrap rail, 7 or to increase the profits of
an already profitable "bridge traffic" operation by leasing better lo-
cated facilities from another railroad instead of maintaining its own
road."' That these results seem to clash somewhat with those in the
cases discussed above tends to confirm the expectation that lack of
55. Winona R.R. Abandonment, F.D. 16566, 282 I.C.C. 802 (1951).
56. Boston & M.R.R. Abandonment, 290 I.C.C. 415 (1954).
57. Missouri & A. Ry. Receivers Abandonment, 271 I.C.C. 171 (1948).
58. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. Abandonment, 271 I.C.c. 261 (1948).
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a well-defined basic norm to which a judgment can be related dll
create uncertainty about what a just ruling would be. Taken to-
gether, the cases do suggest that the competitive norm does not
now play the simple role originally envisioned for it in the devel-
opment of railroad regulation.59
V
The impression thus derived from a reading of abandonment re-
ports is strengthened by other aspects of recent abandonment history.
Witness, for example, the emergence in 1942 of the rule that the
Commission could and would attach to abandonment certificates
conditions protecting displaced workers. It is true that this respon-
sibility was forced upon a reluctant Commission by the Supreme
Court,6" but the result was that the Commission no longer avoided
protecting the interests of particular persons against hardships dic-
tated by market-oriented measures of efficiency.0' Deliberate inter-
vention on the basis of an alleged "national interest in the stability
of the labor supply available to the railroads" 6 implies recourse to
standards quite different from one idealizing a competitive adjust-
ment to an abandonment 6 3
At almost the same time other evidence appeared that the po-
tency of the market norm in abandonment cases had changed. In
1943, Senator Clyde Reed submitted to the 78th Congress a bill
"to establish additional standards and to declare the policy of the
Congress with respect to the abandonment of railroad lines." 0
59. The courts, by reason of the well-established principle that discretionary judg:
ments of administrative tribunals should be respected, have had little reason tolenge ICC interpretations of "public convenience and necessity." Csamunico.; op. cit.
supra note 12, at 69--79. But, in a 1951 dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
found an opportunity to declare that the code ot ordinary competitive business wasinappropriate for transportation: "[U]nlike a department store or a groceray, a railroad
cannot of its own free will discontinue a particular service to the public because anitem of its business has become unprofitable." Alab ma Pub. Ser. Comm'n v. Southern
Ry., 341 U.s. 341, 353 (1951).60. ICC v. Bailway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942).61. The Commission had adopted a contrary stance, quite consistent with a notion
of itself as a judge only to the degree that the market is imperfect. In ro Chicago Cr.
West. R.R. Trackage, 207 I.C.C. 315 (1935).62. Mr. Justice Black, in ICC v. tailway Labor Exec. Assn, 315 U.S. 373, 377
(1942).63. Workers are spared from accepting the wage a free market would establish andthe railroads required to moderate the pace of innovation. That the ideal sustaining
social control in the interest of stability or security is, at least to the present time, a
much less precise concept than the comgetitive model may be inferred from the factthat the Commission has not used a "particularist" approach when writing laborconditions into an abandonment certificate, but has instead relied upon iechaneial
application of the so-called Burlington Rule, established in Chicago, B. & ..h
Abandonment, 257 LC.C. 700 (1944).
64. S. Doe. No. 1489, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1943).
1958]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
The bill was introduced as a reaction against the war-engendered
rush in 1942 for scrap rails, and the opening phrases pointed to the
social interest that it was felt regulation should protect:
Be it enacted .. . that it is found and declared that the construction
and operation of railroad lines induces the location of homes and the
establishment of business enterprises and development of communities
along such railroad lines by the public, in reliance upon the continued
operation thereof as a permanent means of transportation; that the aban-
donment of such railroad lines ordinarily entails loss and hardship to in-
dividuals and disruption and destruction to established commerce, both
intrastate and interstate, and endangers the prosperity and continued ex-
istence of communities served by the abandoned railroad lines. .... 0.
While the bill provided only that no abandonment be permitted
"unless and until it shall conclusively appear that the efficiency of
the national transportation system will be increased thereby,""0 the
concept of efficiency thus catered to was hardly that incorporated
in the notion of a competitive market. The "findings" required to
support a ruling in favor of an applicant were spelled out, and they
made abundantly clear that the intent was to block abandonments,
regardless of why rail traffic was suffering, so long as the narrow
confiscation rule of Brooks-Scanlon 67 did not apply. At the hearings
on the Reed bill,"' the state railroad commissioners, who may be
presumed to have tried to express consciously the social morality
of their communities, endorsed the bill just because it would secure
those communities against rapid economic adjustment.09 And they
suggested that in a society giving renewed emphasis to considera-
tions of security and stability, the deliberate sacrifice of the gains
from enterprise may be prescribed first in the transport sector.70
Even before Senator Reed's efforts, the Transportation Act of
1940- and particularly its introductory Declaration of National
Transportation Policy- underlined the importance of nonmarket
factors in all transportation decisions. The railroads, whose so-called
Committee of Six first proposed the Declaration, no doubt assumed
65. Id. at 1-2.
66. Id. at 2-3.
67. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396 (1920).
68. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Abandonment of Railroad Lines of tho
Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 78tH Cong., 2d Sess. (1944).
69. Mr. John Benton, speaking for 33 state railroad and utilities commissions, berated
the ICC for its refusal in a 1944 proceeding, Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Abandonment,
254 I.C.C. 767 (1944), to attach a stigma to abandonments motivated by an oppor-
tunity to establish tax losses, and Senator Reed expressed vigorous agreement. hlear-
ings, supra note 68, at 11.
70. Id. at 63 (testimony of Commissioner McConnell). The rationale for such a
priority lies, perhaps, in the fact that "changes in the technique or efficiency of
transport affect all industries, not in equal degree, but to some extent, [which] tends
to set transport apart from other industries, changes in whose technique are likely to




-as they seem still to assume-that any "clarification" or even
"articulation" of public policy would necessarily reflect the com-
petitive norm and thereby remind the Commission that the (al-
leged) new ubiquity of competition in transport explained and
justified the railroads hopes for greater freedom to compete as they
saw fit. The railroads did not yet have the benefit of the British ex-
perience, which proved by the nationalization of transport in 1947
that acknowledgment of pervasive competition was compatible with
a forthright denial of the competitive norm." It is true that the
Policy, when declaring an intention to "promote safe, adequate,
economical and efficient service and foster sound economic condi-
tions in transportation and among the several carriers," or of avoid-
ing "unjust discriminations, "undue" preferences, and "destructive"
competitive practices, could be voicing a hope that regulation will
produce a "competitive" result. But the Declaration also speaks
forthrightly of "preserving the inherent advantages" of each type
of carrier, and it explicitly adds "the needs of the Postal Service and
of the national defense" to "the needs of commerce" as reasons for
administrative intervention. 72 The railroads now give priority to the
need for a revision of the Declaration of Policy. The urgency of
their request, moreover, testifies to the fact that the act of 1940
did represent a challenge to the use of the competitive norm for
transport.74
The Transportation Act of 1958'5 it is true, may prove to be a
reversal of the suggested trend and a significant reaffirmation of the
competitive norm. Certainly the railroads were pressing for such a
result. But this outcome is by no means certain or necessary. As has
already been noted, only actual cases can tell whether the increase
in Commission control over service discontinuances-if its consti-
tutionality is sustained-will significantly alter the pace at which
passengers must adjust to the impact of competition upon their ac-
customed mode of travel, or entire communities to their own related
problems. And, though the railroads may hope for greater freedom
71. The significance of such a possibility is not diminished by the fact that a later
government undertook to reverse the nationalization of trucking. British railroading
reacted to the motor transport threat exactly as its American counterpart was to do
later. The industry campaigned for a "Square Deal," which meant greater freedom
to set rates "as competition required." Since the average rail haul is shorter in Britain
than in this country, the pervasiveness of truck rivalry was even more easily demon-
strated. See MANcE, THE RoAD Am RAIL TRANsposr PaoBLzmr, especially 112-31
(1940).
72. Interstate Commerce Act, Declaration of National Transportation Policy, 54
Stat. 899 (1940).
73. See testimony by the Department of Commerce and by railroad spokesmen.
Hearings on Transportation Policy, supra note 80, at 172, 580, 561.
74. See Commissioner Eastman's speech to the American Economic Association in
December, 1989, The Transport Problem, 80 A. EcoN. REv. Stp. 124 (1940).
75. 72 STAT. 568 (U.S. CODE CoNG. & A. NEws 2969 (Aug. 20, 1958) ).
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to compete by rate setting under the revised rule of rate making, 0
the acceptance of the new language by the ICC makes it an opien
question whether a shift toward less inhibited competitiveness has
in fact been achieved. ICC commissioners have testified that the
constraints chiefly complained of by the railroads are required by
the Declaration of National Policy in the Interstate Commerce Act."
The act of 1958 does not change this Declaration, but, on the con-
trary, specifically reinforces it when announcing in very broad terms
the purpose of the new legislation.78 The revision of the rate making
rule, as just noted, incorporates a similar reference. The act and the
debates leading to its enactment are episodes in the reexamination
of our basic transportation norm to which the nation was called by
the Weeks Report in 1955.71 But vigorous claims of growing com-
petitiveness in transport have not yet produced the expected com-
mitment to greater reliance upon the competitive test for all policy.
This persistent ambiguity about the proper role of competition- in
spite of its alleged ubiquity- is itself a comment upon the present
vitality of the norm.
If evidence taken from abandonment cases and legislative history
ran counter to the evidence in related areas of social experience, its
value might be discounted. The fact is undoubtedly quite the re-
verse. Certainly public policy in the area of antitrust, marked by
confusion about whether competition or competitors or both ought
to be protected, and harassed by the difficulty of identifying the
ideally competitive oligopolist, does not bear witness to a clear con-
viction that just and unjust decisions can be distinguished by refer-
ence to the traditional competitive standard. Doubts created by the
Transportation Acts of 1920 and 1940 about the norm underlying
regulation of transport have their parallels as the result of the
Robinson-Patman Act, fair trade legislation, and current efforts to
tighten restrictions upon the right of corporations to merge. 0 And
76. A paragraph was added to the rule declaring: "In a proceeding involving com-
petition between carriers of different modes of transportation subject to this Act, the
Commission, in determining whether a rate is lower than a reasonable minimum rate,
shall consider the facts and circumstances attending the movement of the traffic by
the carrier or carriers to which the rate is applicable. Rates of a carrier shall not be
held up to a particular level to protect the traffic of any other mode of transportation,
giving due consideration to the objectives of the national transportation policy declared
in this Act." (Emphasis added.)
77. See, e.g., the statement of Commissioner A. Arpaia in Hearings on Transportation
Policy, supra note 80, at 295.
78. Section 501: ". . . to encourage the employment of labor and to foster the
preservation and development of a national transportation system adequate to meet
the needs of the commerce of the United States, of the postal service, and of the
national defense."
79. PRESmIENTIAL ADVISORY CO-m TTEE ON TRANSPORT POLICY AND OROANIZA-
'ION, REVISION OF FEDERAL TRANSPORTATION POLICY, April, 1955.
80. See WrLcox, PUBLIC PoLxmcs TOwARD BUSINESS 187, 411-27 (1955); see also
recent efforts to inhibit mergers by requiring advance notice in various circumstances,
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the oligopolistic implications of rivalry between large railroads and
numerous small motor carriers "I find an echo in the patterns of
oligopoly that presently plague efforts to find just results in the
general field of antitrust law. What may be called ideal oligopolistic
behavior has not yet been spelled out either in terms of the con-
ventional competitive norm or in terms of some substitute stand-
ard. 2 All in all, the implications drawn from recent abandonment
experience gain plausibility from reference both to transportation
developments generally and to the problems current in the comple-
mentary area of antitrust law.us
VI
To know that the normative foundation of an important policy
is under attack, or in the process of change, forewarns that decisions
in particular cases will be difficult to justify. By the same token,
explicit awareness of the ideal element in the law should enhance
the capacity to assess proposed policy changes. One critic of the
ICC argues that abandonment procedures be supplemented by a pro-
vision giving railroads an absolute right to abandon at the end of a
definite waiting period.84 Another would broaden the ICC mandate,
discourage a "particularist approach, and permit resolution of the
conflict of interests in typical cases by the application of a better-
planned regulatory strategy. 5 Both proposals were made in full
awareness of the pattern of road-rail competition that had devel-
oped since the present law of abandonments was enunciated in 1920.
But if idealization of competitive behavior is being challenged by
norms emphasizing individual and communal security, proof of in-
tensified inter-carrier rivalry for freight in What Cheer, Iowa, need
not point toward expanding the scope of the North Western's man-
agerial prerogatives with regard to abandonment. It may point, in
fact, to stronger regulatory control, so that in a What Cheer of the
as reflected, for example in Hearings on Legislation Affecting Corporate Mergers Before
the Subcommittee on Antitrust and AMonopolj of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
81. See Harbeson, New Perspectives in Transport Regulation: The Cabinet Com-
mittee Report, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 490 (1957).
82. See generally, Weissman, op. cit. supra note 2, Ch. 4, considering the resulting
uncertainty in the law.
83. Provocative suggestions about other aspects of the economy that have evidenced,
or may reasonably be expected to evidence, a shift in the relative vitality of norms
stressing competition and norms incorporating other values can be found in CALmRArm,
THEa AvLvNT Socia-y (1958).
84. Conant, Railroad Consolidations and the Regulation of Abandonments, 32 M.,D
Eco. 318-25 (1956). The precise waiting period in each case would be set by the
ICC after a hearing, but could not exceed a given maximum, say seven years, fixed by
the law. Under this plan carriers could still utilize present procedures if they felt so
inclined.
85. Cmnmnwox, THE REGuLAION OF RAxUoADABAw.\n N mrs ch. 10 (1948).
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future the desire to protect citizens need not be handicapped by
the Commission's inability to consider any but the particular ap-
plicant's rates and services s.8 If, on the other hand, the competitive
norm is reaffirmed, the "particularist" approach may continue to
serve best the Commission's essential purpose. Granted that it is the
job of the law to do justice, the choice between these divergent pro-
posals must reflect a more fundamental choice with respect to the
norms that sustain such social legislation.
Two things remain to be said here. First, it must be stressed that
to point out challenges to the values that have justified a policy is
not to prove what the outcome of the challenges will be. A variety
of forecasts about transportation can find support in other aspects
of the contemporary scene. The sustained attempt to insulate tarm-
ers against the impact of the competitive market has shown, perhaps
more clearly than it has shown anything else, how difficult it is to
fashion a new norm that is precise enough to avoid condemnation
as mere catering to political power and expediency. On the other
hand, the growing insistence that managers of large corp orations
are somehow responsible to a community larger than the sharehold-
ing group-the abandonment parallel is obvious -indicates that
more experience and sober reflection may not lead to a reaffirma-
tion of the traditional ideal.88 It would, of course, be beyond the
scope of this Article to speculate about whether norms are the
causes or the consequences of social events, or how long Is and
Ought can be divorced in transport law, if at all. But perhaps the
outlining of the specific abandonment problem in these terms will
provide a starting point for further exploration of these jurispru-
dential issues.
A final consideration can be expressed as a question. Do the
unique characteristics of present abandonment law and economics
promise particular insights into the possible future of the competi-
tive norm and the consequent definition of managerial discretion?
86. Whether diversion of the North Western's traffic to the very much shorter Rock
Island branch could have been made to warrant continued operation of tho latter
more easily than abandonment by the Rock Island could be found to justify continued
North Western service to What Cheer was never directly posed for the Commission.
Neither road was a party to the other's application or hearing. The power to join
carriers with whom an applicant shares rates could also affect decisions on nbandon-
ment. For an excellent discussion of the need for a "broader" Commission vision and
authority, but in terms of rates rather than abandonments, see Williams, The 1CC
and the Regulation of Intercarrier Competition, 63 HAnv. L. REv. 1349 (1950).
87. The competitive norm as a guide for transport policy was vigorously championed
recently by Edwards, Application of Market Pricing Factors in the Division of Traffic
According to Principles of Economy and Fitness, 22 ICC Prec. J. 263 (1955); see also
Dewey, Criteria for the Establishment of an Optimum Transportation System, 42 Am.
EcoN. REv. 644 (1952).




It can be said at once that the abandonment process reveals the
tendency of intervention to proliferate. To require that a carrier
continue an operation beyond the time when the market would
divert investment from it must disturb the flow of capital into trans-
port, unless the necessary return can be extracted from operations
of the other system lines or is available from government subsidies.
Since a broad increase in intercarrier competition is not being ruled
out here, such a return presupposes a system of rate and service
controls to limit the pinch of competition, or a system of subsidies
to offset particular deficits. The farm price support program can
again serve as a example of the risks in such broad interference
with market processes. In some respects abandonment control is as
much a blunderbuss method as the parity program, and may be
said to testify in similar fashion to the advantages of uninhibited
and unsubsidized managerial decision-making, with programs of re-
lief quite independent and based upon completely political or hu-
manitarian considerations of need and capacity. From this point of
view abandonment experience would tend to strengthen the role of
a competitive standard as the measure of justified interference
with private enterprise in transport. Yet this experience does not
preclude an opposite inference. The fact is that the absolute control
given to the ICC by the law of abandonments is modified by the
power of the carriers to make an abandonment economically una-
voidable. 9 Furthermore, only a very few of every hundred requests
for a certificate are deniedY0 The Commission in reality has not
eliminated technological change or altered its essential direction.
It has only moderated the pace. The technique used to this end,
involving notice, hearings, and possibilities for delay or the attach-
ment of conditions, is calculated not only to minimize the risk of
managerial errors in connection with a vital community service or
to mitigate the burden in cases of extreme hardship, but also to alert
every shipper to an impending change, whether additional relief is
contemplated or not. To the degree that a similar technique can
be applied in other situations, say when the industry upon which
a community is particularly dependent wants to move, tie railroad
abandonment cases may acquire new significance for a society an-
xious to acknowledge a modest shift in the balance between idealiza-
tion of managerial initiative and idealization of social security.
89. Eventually, delayed maintenance must dominate all other considerations, the
result of a decision to withdraw that the carrier may have made and been implementing
long before the abandonment petition is presented to the Commission. See TnoXm.,
EcoNwomcs oF TRAIsoRT 533 (1955).
90. ICC BunEAu OF TRANSPORTATION EcoNo.ucs AND STATISTICS, op. cit. supra
note 24, at 7. It has been said that railroads only seek permission to abandon when they
are quite certain to get it, but denials would be worth risking to build a record if
management felt particularly abused.
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